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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Free Speech - Granting
Access to Private Shopping Center Property for Free
Speech Purposes on the Basis of a State Constitu-
tional Provision Does Not Violate the Shopping
Center Owner's Federal Constitutional Property
Rights or First Amendment Free Speech Rights.
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035
(1980). In a line of decisions characterized by a strongly di-
vided Court and at least one complete repudiation of a recent
holding,1 the United States Supreme Court has made it clear
that the first amendment of the Federal Constitution 2 pro-
tects free speech activities on privately owned property held
open to the public only under a very limited set of circum-
stances. The key issue in these cases, most of which involved
handbilling or picketing in privately owned shopping centers,
has been "state action." Since the first amendment, as applied
to the states through the fourteenth, prohibits only the state
from restricting free speech, the question becomes, when may
it be applied to regulate the conduct of private persons?
The first cases in the "shopping center" sequence readily
found the requisite "state action" based on a theory that pri-
vate property had been opened to the public, had displaced
1. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972);
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. While the first amendment does not directly apply to the states, it has been
held applicable to them through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The fourteenth amendment is phrased as a prohibi-
tion directed to the states: "No State shall make or enforce any law ... ." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. This language has been interpreted to mean that the amendment is
inapplicable to private parties. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
However, the restrictions prescribed by the amendment may be applied to private
parties if the state's involvement in their acts is such that the court is willing to find
the required state action.
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traditional first amendment forums, and had thereby taken on
a "public function" usually performed by the state.' However,
in later cases the Supreme Court took a much more restrictive
view, confining this public function doctrine to the extremely
narrow case of private property that has assumed all the func-
tions of a municipality. 5
In thus restricting the public function doctrine, the Court
made it clear that any right to engage in free speech activities
on privately owned shopping center property would have to be
found elsewhere than in the Federal Constitution. Acting out
of a concern, shared by many,6 that the displacement of
downtown business districts by shopping centers was in fact
curtailing the availability of first amendment forums, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court recently found such a right of access to
be supported by the California Constitution.7 Its decision was
affirmed unanimously by the United States Supreme Court in
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins."
The dispute in the Prune Yard case arose when students
tried to distribute pamphlets and solicit signatures for a peti-
tion opposing a United Nations resolution in the central
courtyard of the PruneYard Shopping Center. The PruneYard
is a large, privately owned shopping center that is open to the
public for the purpose of encouraging patronage of its many
shops and other facilities. By their activities, which were
peaceful and orderly, the students violated the center's
strictly enforced policy banning publicly expressive activity
4. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Food Employees Local 590 v. Lo-
gan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
5. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S.
507 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S.
507, 539-40 (1976) (footnote omitted):
[T]he owner of the modern shopping center complex ... to some extent dis-
places the "State" from control of historical First Amendment forums ....
The roadways, parking lots, and walkways of the modern shopping center may
be as essential for effective speech as the streets and sidewalks in the munici-
pal or company-owned town.
See generally Comment, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner: The Demise of Logan Valley and
the Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEo. L.J. 1187, 1216-19 (1973) [hereinafter cited as De-
mise]; Note, Hudgens v. NLRB - A Final Definition of the Public Forum?, 13 WAKE
FoREST L. REV. 139, 156-57 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Final Definition].
7. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
8. 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
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unrelated to the center's purposes. When a security guard told
the students to leave, they immediately complied. They later
sought an injunction in the California Superior Court ordering
the PruneYard to grant them access for the purpose of circu-
lating their petitions.'
The superior court held that the students were not entitled
to such access under either the federal or state constitution.I °
The California Court of Appeals affirmed.11 Overruling its ear-
lier decision in Diamond v. Bland (Diamond II), 1" the Califor-
nia Supreme Court reversed, stating that the California Con-
stitution protects "speech and petitioning, reasonably
exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are pri-
vately owned." 13
In unanimously affirming the California Supreme Court's
decision, the United States Supreme Court dealt with three
important constitutional issues. First, it clarified a question
left in some confusion after the Marsh-Hudgens line of
cases, 14 namely, whether those cases, and particularly Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner,15 held that the shopping center owner's fed-
eral constitutional property rights would necessarily be vio-
lated were access to his property to be granted for free speech
purposes. The Court answered this question in the negative."
Having determined that Lloyd did not control the situa-
tion, the Court considered independently the question of the
shopping center owner's federal property rights. It decided
that those rights had not been violated by the California
9. Id. at 2038-39.
10. Id. at 2039.
11. Id.
12. 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974). In Diamond I the California Supreme Court reversed its holding in Diamond
v. Bland (Diamond I), 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971), and found that there was no right to petition on shop-
ping center property, under either the federal or state constitutions, when the peti-
tion's topic was unrelated to the center's operations and adequate alternative avenues
of communication were available. The court indicated that it considered this result to
be compelled by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). See also notes 55 and 56
infra and accompanying text.
13. 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
14. See note 1 supra.
15. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
16. 100 S. Ct. at 2040-41.
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court's decision. 17 Finally, the Court considered a new defense
to the provision of access to shopping center property for free
speech activities, namely, that the owner's federal first
amendment rights would be violated were such access to be
granted. In rejecting this claim, the Court distinguished sev-
eral important recent cases dealing with compelled speech,
the right not to speak, and access to the media.18
Relatively broadly worded, the Prune Yard decision ap-
pears to open the way for states to bypass the restrictive
"state action" holdings of the Lloyd and Hudgens cases by
recognizing a more liberal state-based right to free expression
on private property held open to the public. However, the
cautionary tone of several of the concurring opinions, and the
somewhat unusual characteristics of California law in this
area, suggest that the decision's ultimate effect may be more
limited than it might at first appear.
I. THE SHOPPING CENTER OWNER'S FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
The first major question addressed in the Prune Yard opin-
ion is whether the California court's finding of a state-pro-
tected right to free expression on shopping center property vi-
olated the shopping center owner's19 federal constitutional
property rights. In finding no such violation, the Court first
rejected the owner's contention that Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner"0
was controlling. It then went on to consider the question inde-
pendently of Lloyd. These two steps in the Court's analysis
involve different issues: the first concerns state action and in-
terpretation of Lloyd and related cases, while the second cen-
ters on the factors used by courts to decide when there has
been a constitutionally prohibited taking of property or viola-
tion of due process.
A. Does Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner Control?
Lloyd and the other "shopping center cases" involved the
17. Id. at 2042.
18. Id. at 2043-44.
19. The PruneYard, itself, was also a party to the suit. For the sake of simplicity,
the rest of this article will ignore this fact and will treat the "shopping center owner"
as the only appellant.
20. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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exercise of first amendment free speech rights on private
property. The central problem presented by these cases is the
conflict between first amendment rights and property rights.
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with this conflict
primarily, though not always explicitly, as a question of "state
action." That is, is the property owner's exclusion of would-be
speakers connected closely enough with the state that first
amendment restrictions can be imposed on him?21
This approach would seem to call for two separate inquir-
ies: (1) whether the requirement of state action was met, and
(2) if it was, whether the shopping center owner's property
rights should nevertheless outweigh the speakers' first amend-
ment rights. These theoretically distinct questions have not
been kept separate in Supreme Court opinions in this area,
however, but often appear to be intermingled. This "confu-
sion" of the two issues is perhaps unavoidable, since a finding
of state action necessarily entails infringement on the owner's
property rights.22 However, it has contributed to uncertainty
concerning the actual holding of cases like Lloyd. A review of
the shopping center cases will demonstrate this intermingling
of the state action and property rights issues and will provide
the basis for evaluating the PruneYard Court's finding that
Lloyd did not control.
21. See generally the discussions of the "shopping center cases" appearing in such
articles as Henely, Property Rights and First Amendment Rights: Balance and Con-
flict, 62 A.B.A.J. 77 (1976); Schauer, Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of State
Action in First Amendment Adjudication, 61 MINN. L. REv. 433 (1977); Demise,
supra note 6; Comment, Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center: Federalism and
State Protection of Free Speech, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 805 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Federalism]; and Final Definition, supra note 6.
22. Scholars have suggested that the state action question cannot be decided in
isolation but must be approached via a balancing of conflicting rights. When a ques-
tion of state action arises, the court is not simply faced with deciding whether or not
some required "quantum" of state action exists. Rather, it must decide whether it is
constitutionally permissible for an individual to continue in a practice that has been
challenged by another individual as violative of his constitutional rights. The issue
thus amounts to a conflict of individual rights, and the court must balance those
rights and determine which is to be given preference under the Constitution. As the
same authors note, however, the Supreme Court, while in fact conducting such a bal-
ancing of rights, has done so under the guise of a formalistic search for the requisite
quantum of state action. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 473-75 (1978). See also Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of
the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 221;
notes 78 and 79 infra and accompanying text.
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The first decision in the "shopping center" series, Marsh v.
Alabama, '2  did not concern a shopping center at all, but a
"company town." A Jehovah's Witness was convicted of crimi-
nal trespass after attempting to hand out religious literature
in the business district of Chickasaw, Alabama. While just like
"any other town"2 in other respects, Chickasaw was wholly
owned by a private corporation. The case presented the novel
question whether the first amendment could be applied to a
private owner of city streets and sidewalks.
Noting that a first amendment violation would certainly
have been found had the town been publicly owned,25 the ma-
jority opinion concluded that the fact of private ownership
did not mandate a different result. The public's need and
right to receive information were seen to be the same whether
the "public function" of governing a town is being performed
by a municipality or by a private owner.2" In reaching its con-
clusion, the Court explicitly balanced property rights and first
amendment rights, noting that the latter occupy a preferred
position.27 The Court also remarked on the effect of a private
owner opening his property to the public: "Ownership does
23. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). The decision was a 5-3 decision. Justice Black authored
the majority opinion.
24. Id. at 502.
25. Id. at 504, citing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) and other cases for the
rule that "neither a state nor a municipality can completely bar the distribution of
literature containing religious or political ideas on its streets, sidewalks and public
places or make the right to distribute dependent on a flat license tax or permit to be
issued by an official who could deny it at will."
26. 326 U.S. at 508-09. One commentator has suggested that Marsh's grant of
speaker access to private property was in fact based upon the listener's right to re-
ceive information rather than upon the speaker's right to gain access to the property,
and that a "listeners' rights" standard would provide a workable solution to the prob-
lem of accommodating first amendment and property rights. See Note, Listeners'
Rights Providing a State Action Theory in the "Company Town" Analogues, 55 IND.
L.J. 91 (1979).
27. 326 U.S. at 509. Specifically, the Court stated:
When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against
those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we
remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position .... In
our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the
deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the
public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern
a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the




not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for
his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in
general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.""2
In Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc.,2 9 the Court extended the rationale of Marsh. It held that
the first amendment protected union picketing of a supermar-
ket located in a shopping center. Despite language in Lloyd to
the contrary,30 this decision rested mainly on a finding that
the shopping center was the "functional equivalent"31 of the
Chickasaw business district, was freely accessible to the pub-
lic, and therefore could be treated like public property for
first amendment purposes as was done in Marsh. The Court
restricted its holding to the case where the exercise of first
amendment rights was related to the use of the property.3 2
The majority opinion did not explicitly "balance" first
amendment rights and property rights. However, the Court
did state that the sole justification offered for denying the
picketers' free speech rights was the asserted absolute right of
the property owner to exclude others. 3 In a strong dissent,
Justice Black (the author of the majority opinion in Marsh)
objected that the Court's holding violated the shopping center
owner's federal constitutional property rights and was
28. Id. at 506 (citations omitted). This passage from Marsh is frequently quoted,
and has been relied on by many as the heart of the case. See, e.g., Justice Marshall's
dissenting opinion in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 573-74 (1972); Demise,
supra note 6, at 1191-92, 1196-97.
29. 391 U.S. 308 (1968). The decision was a 6-3 decision, Justice Marshall speak-
ing for the majority.
30. The Lloyd majority dismissed Logan's allegedly overbroad reading of Marsh
as unnecessary to the decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 561-63 (1972).
See the further discussion of this point at notes 40-43 infra and accompanying text.,,
31. 391 U.S. at 318.
32. Id. at 319-20. In a footnote, the Court explicitly reserved the question whether
the shopping center owner's property rights could, consistently with the first amend-
ment, "justify a bar on picketing which was not thus directly related in its purpose to
the use to which the shopping center property was being put." Id. at 320 n.9. This is
arguably the question that was addressed in the Lloyd case.
33. Id. at 324. In this connection, the Court noted that "naked title" was all that
was at issue: unlike a homeowner, the shopping center owner had no meaningful
claim to a right to privacy, having already opened his property to the public, and no
significant interference with the normal operation of the property had been shown.
These factors were also important in the PruneYard decision. See discussion in text
accompanying notes 110-12 and 119-30.
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founded on an overly broad interpretation of Marsh.4
A fear that Logan would be extended too far, 5 combined
with changes in the makeup of the Court,8 was probably what
led to the eventual repudiation of Logan and limitation of
Marsh in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner 7 and its successor, Hudgens
v. NLRB.35 Lloyd was decided only four years after Logan.
The facts were very similar to those in Prune Yard. Both cases
involved distribution in the enclosed mall of a large shopping
center of literature containing a message unrelated to the
center's use.3 9
In reversing the state court's finding that the shopping
center's owner had violated the handbillers' first amendment
rights by forcing them to leave the premises, the Supreme
Court took pains to distinguish Lloyd from Logan. The Court
first dismissed the "functional equivalent" 40 language in Lo-
gan as unnecessary to the decision and criticized Logan's
reading of Marsh as too broad.4' Marsh's true basis was stated
to be that suggested by Justice Black's Logan dissent, namely,
the fact that Chickasaw had" 'all the attributes of a town' -142
34. Id. at 327-33.
35. Justice White's dissent in Logan exemplifies this concern that Logan could
not be kept within bounds. He expressed the fear that under the rationale adopted by
the majority, free expression unrelated to a shopping center's use would have to be
permitted, as would nonobstructive picketing or free speech activities on the parking
lot of a free-standing store or even within a store itself. Id. at 337-40.
36. At the time Logan was decided, the Court consisted of Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Fortas, Douglas, Black, Harlan, White, Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart.
When Lloyd was decided, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist
had replaced Chief Justice Warren and Justices Harlan and Fortas.
37. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
38. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
39. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 553-56 (1972).
40. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
41. 407 U.S. at 561-64. Specifically, the Court stated: "There is some language in
Logan Valley, unnecessary to the decision, suggesting that the key focus of Marsh was
upon the 'business district,' and that whenever a privately owned business district
serves the public generally its sidewalks and streets become the functional
equivalents of similar public facilities." Id. at 562 (footnote omitted). After extensive
citations from Justice Black's Logan dissent, the Court went on to state:
The holding in Logan Valley was not dependent upon the suggestion that
the privately owned streets and sidewalks of a business district or a shopping
center are the equivalent, for First Amendment purposes, of municipally
owned streets and sidewalks. No such expansive reading of the opinion of the
Court is necessary or appropriate.
Id. at 563.
42. Id. at 563.
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and its owner was "substituting for and performing the cus-
tomary functions of government."43
The Court saw Logan as being grounded not on its inter-
pretation of Marsh but on a particular factual situation. The
two critical factors were said to be: (1) the free speech in-
volved was related to the use of the shopping center, and (2)
no adequate alternative avenues of communication were avail-
able.44 Since neither factual condition was met in Lloyd, the
Court found Logan to be distinguishable. It held that there
was "no such dedication of Lloyd's privately owned and oper-
ated shopping center to public use as to entitle respondents to
exercise therein the asserted First Amendment rights."'45
Despite the Court's careful attempt to distinguish Logan,
commentators generally interpreted Lloyd as having overruled
the earlier case sub silentio.4' The majority opinion in Hudg-
ens v. NLRB,47 decided four years later, confirmed this view.
Hudgens involved labor union picketing of a store in a shop-
ping center by striking employees of the store's warehouse.4 8
In concluding that the first amendment was inapplicable to
this situation, the Supreme Court proclaimed that Lloyd had
in fact overruled Logan. The Lloyd Court's attempt to distin-
guish the cases was based in part on the content of the
speech. For this reason the Court's analysis could not stand,
because expression protected by the first amendment may not
constitutionally be regulated on the basis of its content.49
The result of Lloyd and Hudgens was to limit Marsh to its
facts and to make it clear that the Supreme Court recognized
no first amendment right to free expression on shopping
center property, whether or not the message was related to
the property's use. What was less clear was the role the shop-
ping center owner's property rights played in this conclusion.
This uncertainty was due partly to the intermingling of
property rights and state action considerations in Lloyd. The
issue in Lloyd was framed in property rights terms: "We
43. Id. at 562.
44. Id. at 563.
45. Id. at 570.
46. See, e.g., Demise, supra note 6.
47. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
48. Id. at 508-09.
49. Id. at 517-21.
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granted certiorari to consider petitioner's contention that the
decision below violates rights of private property protected by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." 0 In contrast, the
holding was stated in terms of the applicability of the first
amendment.51 Other references to property rights pervaded
the opinion. At one point the Court commented that it would
be an "unwarranted infringement of property rights to require
them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights '52
when alternative avenues of communication were available.
Later, the Court referred several times to the due process and
taking clauses of the Consitution, 5 eventually concluding that
the proper accommodation between the rights protected by
these provisions and first amendment rights "is clear ' 54 in the
present case (i.e., property rights outweigh first amendment
rights?).
Given this language, it was not surprising that the
PruneYard's owner argued that Lloyd required a decision in
his favor. He was, in fact, not the first to take this position.
Under facts very similar to those in the PruneYard case, the
California court itself, in its earlier decision Diamond v.
Bland (Diamond II), 55 had professed itself barred by Lloyd's
"due process 5'6 holding from finding that the California Con-
stitution protected free expression on shopping center prop-
erty. Some other courts came to a similar conclusion,57 though
50. 407 U.S. at 552-53 (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 570. The holding is quoted in the text accompanying note 45 supra.
52. Id. at 567. The Court went on to say, "Such an accommodation would dimin-
ish property rights without significantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech."
Id.
53. Id. at 567, 570.
54. Id. at 570.
55. 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974). The case involved an attempt to solicit signatures on an anti-pollution initia-
tive petition and to distribute leaflets regarding the initiative at a large shopping
center. See also note 12 supra.
56. Id. at 336 n.4, 521 P.2d at 463 n.4, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 471 n.4. The court stated,
"Under the holding of the Lloyd case, the due process clause of the United States
Constitution protects the property interests of the shopping center owner from in-
fringement." Id., citing to the property rights language in Lloyd mentioned in notes
50-54 supra and accompanying text. The Court concluded that given Lloyd, to find a
right to free speech on shopping center property under the California Constitution
would violate the shopping center owner's "federal constitutional rights." Id. (cita-
tion omitted; emphasis in original).
57. See, e.g., Lenrich Associates v. Heyda, 504 P.2d 112, 115-16 (Ore. 1972) (plu-
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their interpretation of Lloyd was criticized by
commentators.58
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,59 the United
States Supreme Court resolved the confusion arising out of
the property rights language in Lloyd. The Court decisively
rejected the contention that Lloyd prevented free speech
rights being granted on private property on some basis other
than the first amendment.60 This decision seemed to be
founded on two considerations: (1) interpretation of the basis
of decision in Lloyd and (2) the difference in the legal analysis
required when the free speech right is founded on a statute or
state constitution rather than the first amendment.
With respect to the first consideration, the opinion sug-
gested, without saying so explicitly, that the decision in Lloyd
was based purely on a finding of "no state action." Thus, the
PruneYard Court carefully stated Lloyd's holding in terms of
the applicability of the first amendment: "Lloyd held that
when a shopping center owner opens his private property to
the public for the purpose of shopping, the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution does not thereby create in-
dividual rights in expression beyond those already existing
under applicable law."'81
The Court did not mention the property rights language in
Lloyd, but instead emphasized the Lloyd Court's observation
that private property does not somehow become public prop-
erty (and so meet the state action requirement and become
subject to the first amendment) by virtue of being open to the
public for certain purposes.2 The implication is that Lloyd
represented a refusal to follow the liberal approach to state
action taken in Logan. The Lloyd Court simply refused to in-
terpret the shopping center owner's actions as closely enough
associated with the state for the first amendment to apply.
If this was, in fact, the basis of Lloyd, and if it is assumed
rality opinion) (it would violate federal constitutional property rights under Lloyd to
provide access to shopping center property, based on a state constitutional provision,
for purposes of distributing literature and discussing religion).
58. See, e.g., Note, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1592 (1973).
59. 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
60. Id. at 2040-41.
61. Id. at 2041 (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 2040.
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that the state action and property rights questions can be
kept separate, then the Lloyd decision must be seen as irrele-
vant to the issue in PruneYard. On this analysis, Lloyd sim-
ply decided there was no state action. This says nothing about
the weight to be given federal property rights when the state
action question is not involved because a right to free expres-
sion has already been found based on a statute or state
constitution.
The second consideration underlying the PruneYard
Court's decision was the fact that in Lloyd, "there was no
state constitutional or statutory provision that had been con-
strued to create rights to the use of private property by stran-
gers." ' s This distinction between the cases makes a significant
difference in the legal analysis that is applicable. States are
free to adopt more expansive individual liberties in their con-
stitutions than the Federal Constitution provides.6 4 States
may also place reasonable police power restrictions on private
property so long as these do not violate any federal consitu-
tional provision.6 5 Thus, in the Lloyd situation, the initial is-
sue is whether the state action requirement has been met, so
that the first amendment will apply. In a case like Prune Yard,
however, the analysis begins with a settled judgment that a
right to free expression exists based on state law. The Su-
preme Court cannot challenge the state's interpretation of its
own law, 6 and it will ordinarily give great deference to the
judgment of the legislature or the people of the state as em-
bodied in a statute or state constitutional provision. 7 This
difference in legal analysis is so significant that, as one com-
mentator has suggested, Lloyd should not control the situa-
tion in PruneYard even if the Lloyd decision were based on a
finding that federal constitutional property rights outweigh
first amendment rights.6"
Despite the property rights language in Lloyd, much sup-
63. Id.
64. Id., citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
65. Id. at 2040-41.
66. See, e.g., Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486 (1947).
67. See generally discussion of substantive due process in Comment, Balancing
Private Loss Against Public Gain to Test for a Violation of Due Process or a Taking
Without Just Compensation, 54 WASH. L. Rav. 315, 319-20 (1979).
68. See Note, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1592, 1599-1606 (1973).
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port can be found for the PruneYard Court's reading of the
case. In the Lloyd opinion itself, the holding was stated in
terms of the inapplicability of the first amendment.6 9 Al-
though the issue was framed in property rights terms,70 this
can be explained by noting that it stated the shopping center
owner's contention. Since he lost in the court below (unlike
his counterparts in Marsh and Logan), it would have been
natural for him to argue on review that his constitutional
property rights had been violated. The other property rights
language can probably be read as simply bolstering the find-
ing of no state action. 1
Other cases support the PruneYard Court's interpretation
of Lloyd. Commentators have pointed to Central Hardware
Co. v. NLRB, 2 decided the same day as Lloyd, as evidence
that Lloyd did not preclude the exercise of free speech rights
on private property if based on grounds other than the first
amendment. Central Hardware involved union solicitation of
employees in the parking lot of a free-standing store.7 3 Using
property rights language similar to that in Lloyd, the Court
refused to extend Logan to the case of a free-standing store
simply because it was open to the public, and held that the
activity was unprotected by the first amendment.7 ' Yet the
case was remanded to the National Labor Relations Board for
a balancing of employee rights under the National Labor Re-
lations Act against property rights.7 5 This indicated that prop-
erty rights would not necessarily prevail over free speech
rights founded on sources other than the first amendment.
Hudgens v. NLRB illustrates the same point. It was also re-
manded to the NLRB after the first amendment was found to
be inapplicable.76 Finally, it is noteworthy that commentators
69. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
70. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
71. Other possible significance of the property rights language in Lloyd is dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 78-84 infra.
72. 407 U.S. 539 (1972). See, e.g., Note, 86 H~Av. L. Rv. 1592 (1973).
73. 407 U.S. at 540-41.
74. Id. at 546-47.
75. Id. at 547-48.
76. 424 U.S. 507, 522-23 (1976). After noting that the first amendment applies
only to cases involving action by the state, the Court made a statement that consti-
tutes strong support for the view of Lloyd taken in PruneYard: "Thus, while statu-
tory or common law may in some situations extend protection or provide redress
1981]
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interpreted Lloyd to have the effect given it by the
PruneYard Court."
While the approach taken by the Court in PruneYard
seems consistent with the intent of Lloyd, it is nevertheless
striking how little weight the Court gave to the property
rights language in Lloyd. Indeed, the Court did not even men-
tion that language. One explanation for this is the straightfor-
ward one that the Court decided Lloyd was based purely on
state action grounds; therefore, the property rights language
was irrelevant. However, this view seems simplistic in several
respects. First, Lloyd did refer to infringements of property
rights and "accommodations" between such rights and first
amendment rights. This was also true of other cases in the
shopping center series - most notably Marsh, which explic-
itly balanced first amendment and property rights.
Second, as scholars have noted, it is almost unavoidable
that the state action question will in fact involve some kind of
balancing of individual rights.78 Cases where state action is an
issue usually arise when one individual, A, claims another in-
dividual, B, has violated his constitutional rights. If no state
action is found, A will feel his rights have been violated. If
state action is found, though, B's freedom of action will be
circumscribed, and he will almost certainly feel his rights have
been violated.79 Thus, the Court cannot decide the state ac-
tion question without deciding, on some level, whether A's
rights or B's rights should be given greater weight.
Finally, a decision regarding the state action question is
not simply a matter of applying a fixed definition to a set of
facts. While there are undoubtedly many cases where the exis-
tence or nonexistence of state action is clear, there are many
against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the free expression of
others, no such protection or redress is provided by the Constitution itself." Id. at
513.
77. See, e.g., Note, 86 HARv. L. RE V. 1592, 1599-1606 (1973).
78. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSITrUTIONAL LAW
473-75 (1978).
79. It should be noted that this kind of situation can arise with respect to rights
other than those related to free speech. For example, a restaurant owner might well
claim his constitutional right to freedom of association is being violated if he is com-
pelled to admit blacks to his restaurant on the basis that his conduct is somehow
closely enough associated with the state that constitutional equal protection guaran-
tees apply to him.
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others in which a finding either way would be reasonable. In
the latter cases, whether a court finds state action or not is
essentially a policy decision, based on a balancing of rights
and the perceived consequences of the alternative choices.
This is illustrated by the rapid expansion and contraction of
the meaning of "state action" in recent years. From the argua-
bly broad use given the term in Logan, the current Court con-
stricted it somewhat in Lloyd and Hudgens, and has since
narrowed its scope even more, in such cases as Flagg Brothers,
Inc. v. Brooks. 0
The conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is
that Lloyd is not "simply" a state action case. Rather, it rep-
resents a policy decision in which property rights have been
given greater priority than first amendment rights. Since first
amendment rights have traditionally occupied a "preferred
position,"81 it is troubling that they appear to weigh so much
less heavily against property rights than the state-created free
speech rights do in the PruneYard decision. Several explana-
tions for this were suggested earlier. The first amendment
rights face the hurdle of the state action requirement, which
has perhaps been treated too formalistically by the Court.
Also, the legal analysis is different when the starting point is a
right based on a statute or state constitution rather than the
first amendment.
These two explanations do not seem sufficient, however.
One final ingredient must be found in the current Court's gen-
eral reluctance to extend federal civil rights and simultaneous
generosity toward states' rights. While the Court has taken a
fairly liberal view toward some cases involving individual lib-
erties, 82 in many areas its decisions have represented a re-
trenchment of previous broader readings of constitutional
80. 436 U.S. 149 (1978). In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the author of
PruneYard, the Court held that a warehouseman's proposed sale of goods entrusted
to him for storage, as permitted by New York law, was not state action, on the basis
that a power delegated by the state will constitute state action only if it is a tradition-
ally exclusive state power. See also Note, Constitutional Law - State Action De-
fined Anew, 27 KAN. L. REv. 674 (1979).
81. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
82. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam) (symbolic speech). See generally Yarbrough, The
Burger Court and Freedom of Expression, 33 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 37 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Yarbrough]. I
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provisions.8 At the same time, the Court, and particularly
Justice Rehnquist, has been very willing to respect state-made
choices.8
In the situation involved in the PruneYard case, consider-
able justification exists for leaving to the states the decision
whether or not to grant free speech rights on private property.
As noted by Justice Marshall, Marsh represented a policy de-
cision that the availability of traditional first amendment fo-
rums should be protected against increasing monopolization
by private parties.8 5 The need for such protection seems al-
most as obvious in the case of shopping centers as in that of
company towns, given statistics on the extent to which the
former are taking over business that used to be carried out in
downtown areas.88 Since the extent of this monopoly varies
greatly from place to place, however, with California perhaps
being one of the most "monopolized" states, it seems sensible
to allow the states to decide individually how much protection
of free speech rights is necessary.
More generally, the Court's decision in PruneYard is to be
applauded as a partial opening of the door slammed shut in
Lloyd and Hudgens. It presents new opportunities to safe-
guard free speech rights under the conditions prevailing in
modern society. The PruneYard Court's generous attitude to-
ward state protection of those rights suggests that reliance on
a state constitution or state or federal statutory provision,
rather than the Federal Constitution, offers the greatest likeli-
83. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) ("liberty" under the due process
clause); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (Miranda rights); Young v. Ameri-
can Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (restrictions on movie theaters based on
content of picture). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection
of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. RFv. 489 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brennan];
Yarbrough, supra note 82.
84. See, e.g., the strong defense given states' rights by Justice Rehnquist in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840-46 (1976). See generally Brennan,
supra note 83; Yarbrough, supra note 82.
85. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 538-43 (1976) (dissenting opinion).
86. For instance, the California court noted in Robins v. PruneYard Shopping
Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), afl'd, 100 S. Ct. 2035
(1980), that in 1972 the central business district accounted for only 4.67% of San
Jose county's retail sales, while in one 30-day period adults making one or more shop-
ping trips to the 15 largest shopping centers in the metropolitan San Jose area to-
taled 685,000 out of 788,000 adult residents. See generally How Shopping Malls Are
Changing Life in the U.S., U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPoRT, June 18, 1973; Muller &
Thomas, Urban Growth and Decline, CHALLENGE, May-June 1976.
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hood of success to those seeking to ensure or expand individ-
ual liberties.
This statement requires one caveat. While the majority
opinion in PruneYard is framed quite broadly, most of the
concurring opinions criticize its breadth. This suggests that
despite the Court's support for states' rights, expansion of in-
dividual liberties based on state law will not be allowed to
proceed indefinitely. 7
B. The Shopping Center Owner's Federal Property Rights
Were Not Violated
As the Court in PruneYard noted, a state is free to adopt
in its own constitution broader individual liberties than those
conferred by the Federal Constitution." Furthermore, in exer-
cising its police power, a state "may adopt reasonable restric-
tions on private property so long as the restrictions do not
amount to a taking without just compensation or contravene
any other federal constitutional provision."8' 9 Having deter-
mined that Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner"0 did not decide whether a
grant of free speech rights on private property based on a
state constitution would violate the owner's federal constitu-
tional property rights, the PruneYard Court went on to con-
87. Noting the increasing private control of areas traditionally considered first
amendment forums, one commentator speculated that the Supreme Court "may
eventually be forced to retrace its path from Hudgens back to Marsh in order to
accommodate the owner's rights with the first amendment rights of dissidents." Final
Definition, supra note 6, at 159. While the Court has not returned to Marsh via the
route of the first amendment, it is arguable that the PruneYard decision could open
the way to a return to the policy of Marsh via state protection of free speech, with
the caveats stated in the text. Thus, it is ironic that if a large number of states
adopted a position like that of California, the result would approximate the broad
protection for free speech, related and unrelated to the property's use, that seemed to
be so feared by the Logan dissenters. Given this observation, the fears about ex-
tending Logan seem to be related as much to a fear of extending federal civil rights as
to a concern for the shopping center owner's property rights.
88. 100 S. Ct. at 2040, citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). A num-
ber of state courts have interpreted provisions in their state constitutions more ex-
pansively than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the corresponding
federal guarantees, even though the state and federal provisions were identically
worded. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (construing provi-
sion of New Jersey Constitution identical to fourth amendment). See generally Bren-
nan, supra note 83, at 498-501.
89. 100 S. Ct. at 2040-41 (citations omitted).
90. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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sider this question independently of Lloyd.
There are two principal constitutional limitations on state
infringements on property rights: the fifth amendment's pro-
hibition against taking of private property without just com-
pensation,"' and the fourteenth amendment's ban on depriva-
tion of property without due process of law.92 These two
prohibitions have often been confused by courts and commen-
tators, but each in fact has a different basis.9 3 The PruneYard
Court recognized this and treated the two requirements
separately.
It is a truism that government could not function unless
property rights could sometimes be infringed upon without
compensation, in the public interest. However, whether com-
pensation is due or not, governmental actions should still
comport with a minimal standard of propriety, and it is this
restriction that is embodied in the due process clause." The
test for compliance with due process manifests the deference
given by the courts to legislative judgment. As stated by the
Court in PruneYard: " '[T]he guaranty of due process... de-
mands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real
and substantial relation to the objective sought to be [ob-
tained].' ,,95
Applying this test to the facts in Prune Yard, the Court
had little difficulty finding it to be met, based on California's
legitimate interest "in promoting more expansive rights of
free speech and petition than conferred by the Federal Con-
stitution."9 6 Other than simply noting that free speech is a
somewhat unusual objective for a "police power" regulation,97
91. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The restrictions imposed by this clause have been held
to be applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.
Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233, 236-37 (1897). This provision will be referred to as
the "taking clause."
92. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
93. See Comment, Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain to Test for a Vio-
lation of Due Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REv.
315, 315-27 (1979).
94. Id. at 319-21.
95. 100 S. Ct. at 2042, quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
96. Id. at 2042-43.
97. See discussion of this point in text accompanying notes 113-18 supra.
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it is difficult to quarrel with the Court's conclusion on the due
process issue.
The treatment given the "taking" issue in the PruneYard
opinion merits fuller discussion. As noted by the Court, the
basic idea behind the "taking clause" is that individual prop-
erty owners should not be forced to bear " 'public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the pub-
lic as a whole.'"98 In relation to the taking clause, the word
"property" has been held to encompass not only the physical
thing possessed, but also all rights inherent in the individual's
relationship to that thing.9 The "right to exclude others" is
one such property right. As the PruneYard Court acknowl-
edged, that right was "taken" in this case to the extent that
the PruneYard's owner must allow strangers to exercise free
speech rights on his property.100
The critical issue is whether this is the kind of "taking"
that requires compensation. As commentators have repeatedly
pointed out, no set rule has been developed for making this
determination.101 Rather, the courts have tended to decide
the question on a case-by-case basis.102 The basic distinc-
tion seems to be that between valid exercises of the police
power and takings. Police power regulations are generally
defined as those needed to protect the public health, safety,
morals, or welfare. Such regulations may be imposed without
compensation for resulting loss to individual owners. Mea-
sures not justified as police power regulations in the eyes of
the courts are apt to be characterized as "takings" requiring
compensation.103
A number of tests have been developed to aid in recogniz-
98. 100 S. Ct. at 2041, quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
99. Id. at 2041 n.6, citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373
(1945). See generally 2 P. NicHOLS, EMmNENT DoMAIN §§ 6.1, 6.3 (rev. 3d ed. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as NiCHOLS].
100. 100 S. Ct. at 2041.
101. See, e.g., Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [herein-
after cited as Sax]; Michelnan, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, SO HAv. L. REv. 1165 (1967)"
[hereinafter cited as Michelman]; Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspec-
tive: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. Rxv. 63.
102. See, e.g., authorities cited note 101 supra.
103. See generally Mercer, Regulation (Police Power) v. Taking (Eminent Do-
main), 6 N.C. CEr. L.J. 177 (1975); Michelman, supra note 101; Sax, supra note 101.
1981]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ing the often obscure division between police power regula-
tions and takings. They can perhaps be divided into two cate-
gories, depending on whether the difference between the two
is thought to be qualitative or quantitative. In the first cate-
gory falls one of the oldest tests, namely, whether or not there
has been an actual appropriation or physical invasion of the
property for public use or benefit. 10 4 This test is rarely em-
ployed in a limiting way today: an appropriation or physical
invasion is still almost invariably sufficient for a taking, but is
no longer considered necessary. 10 5 Another test in this cate-
gory is the nuisance or, in its more modern version, "creation
of the harm" test. Under this test, no taking will be found if
the property owner's interests are being diminished in order
to protect the public from a harmful situation that the owner
himself helped to bring about. 06
In the second category mentioned above is the diminution-
of-value test. This seems to have been developed by Justice
Holmes, who suggested it in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.10 7 In that case, he took the position that police power
regulations and takings were not qualitatively different, but
occupied a continuum: "while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking."'' 08 The test he apparently used to determine
when a regulation had gone "too far" was the extent to which
the economic value of the property had been diminished.109
104. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (bomber overflights a
direct invasion of property owner's domain); Northern Trans. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S.
635 (1879) (deprivation of access to lots adjoining construction site not a taking);
Horn v. Chicago, 403 IlM. 549, 87 N.E.2d 642 (1949) (no physical invasion of property
so no taking). See generally Michelman, supra note 101, at 1184-90, 1226-29; Sax,
supra note 101, at 46-48.
105. See generally Michelman, supra note 101, at 1184-85, 1228.
106. See generally Sax, supra notp 101, at 48-50; Michelman, supra note 101, at
1196-1200, 1235-38.
107. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
108. Id. at 415.
109. Id. at 413. See generally Sax, supra note 101, at 41-46, 50-60; Michelman,
supra note 101, at 1190-93, 1229-34. In addition to the tests discussed in the text,
commentators have suggested others, in an attempt to reconcile court decisions and
to come up with a rationale, in theory and in practice, for deciding when a taking has
occurred. These include a test based on fairness, Michelman, supra note 101; a test
based on whether the government is acting as entrepreneur or arbiter, Sax, supra
note 101; and a test similar to the "creation of the harm" test, Dunham, Griggs v.
Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation
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The Court in PruneYard seemed to rely mainly on a dimi-
nution-of-value/interference-with-use standard for its deter-
mination that no compensable taking occurred. Quoting the
"when regulation goes too far . . ." language from Penn-
sylvania Coal, the Court listed factors relevant to this deter-
mination: "the character of the governmental action, its eco-
nomic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment
backed expectations." 110 The Court concluded that the Cali-
fornia court's action would not "unreasonably impair the
value or use of [the PruneYard] property as a shopping
center," since:"" (1) the PruneYard was already open to the
public; (2) reasonable time, place, and manner regulations
could be adopted so as to minimize interference with the
center's operation; and (3) the handbillers were orderly and
limited their activities to the common areas of the shopping
center.112
While the Court's finding of "no taking" does not seem un-
reasonable, there are several respects in which it does not
wholly comport with prior law. First, guaranteeing free speech
rights is a somewhat unusual purpose for a police power regu-
lation. Second, the Court dismissed the physical invasion of
the PruneYard's property as not determinative, despite the
general rule, noted earlier, that such invasions are almost al-
ways compensable. These two aspects of the decision warrant
further consideration.
Permissible objectives for police power regulations are gen-
erally stated in terms of safeguarding the public health,
safety, morals, and welfare." 3 While protecting free speech
rights is certainly related to "public welfare" in a broad sense,
it involves a value judgment or policy choice in a way that fire
regulations or zoning laws generally do not. Furthermore, as
one scholar has noted:
[I]n cases in which the public welfare is the only object of a
police regulation, the power injuriously to affect private
Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63. See generally Mercer, Regulation (Police Power) v. Tak-
ing (Eminent Domain), 6 N.C. CENT. L.J. 177 (1975).
110. 100 S. Ct. at 2041-42, citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 383,
390 (1979).
111. 100 S. Ct. at 2042.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 392 (1926).
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property without compensation is much more limited than
in cases in which a similar restraint is placed upon the use of
land in behalf of the public health, morals or safety.114
The Prune Yard Court's willingness to treat the free speech
provision of the California Constitution as a police power reg-
ulation reflects in part the current Court's favorable attitude
toward states' rights.115 Perhaps more importantly, it also ex-
emplifies a trend toward broadening the concept of police
power to meet changed conditions. For instance, recent cases
have approved such untraditional police power objectives as
preserving historic areas, protecting wetlands, and preserving
open space.11 6
Like protecting free speech, these objectives represent pol-
icy choices or value judgments about what is important to so-
ciety. While they are worthy goals, their protection under a
"police power" rationale may create some problems. Police
power regulations often result in restriction of the individual's
use of his property, without compensation, for the public ben-
efit. When the restriction has as its purpose prevention of an
obvious injury to health and safety, its justification is easy to
see. Even here, though, the courts have had great difficulty in
developing a consistent rationale for deciding when compensa-
tion is necessary. 117
A more problematic situation occurs when "police power"
regulations are directed toward goals representing a policy
choice that many members of society may not support. Under
those circumstances the difficulty of justifying the sacrifice
asked of the property owner and of arriving at a fair and pre-
dictable basis on which compensation decisions can be made
increases considerably. In the case of a measure directed to-
ward protecting a basic societal value like free speech, the
problem may not be too significant.'1 8 But the expanded con-
114. NICHOLS, supra note 99, at vol. 1, § 1.42 [8]. An illustration of this point is
that restrictions upon the height of buildings or placement of billboards are much
more likely to be found not to require compensation if founded on reasons of public
health and safety rather than pure aesthetics. Id.
115. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., cases cited in NICHOLS, supra note 99, at vol. 2, § 6.3511 [1].
117. See generally attempts to rationalize court decisions in this area in such
commentaries as Sax, supra note 101.
118. One commentator has suggested that one factor relevant to courts' willing-
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cept of police power implicit in the PruneYard Court's deci-
sion may occasion much more difficult choices when the objec-
tive is less universally shared.
In addition to involving a somewhat unusual goal for a po-
lice power regulation, the state constitutional provision at is-
sue in PruneYard, as applied by the California court, also
contravened the rule that physical invasions of property are
almost always compensable. The PruneYard Court dealt with
this issue in cursory fashion, simply dismissing the mandated
physical invasion as not determinative of the question
whether the shopping center owner must be compensated. 119
The only indication of the Court's underlying reasoning came
in its distinction of an earlier case, Kaiser Aetna v. United
States.20
Kaiser Aetna involved a private pond which its owners
had turned into an exclusive marina, at substantial expense,
by dredging a channel to a navigable bay. The marina was
open only to fee-paying members, the stated purpose being to
protect the privacy and security of the pond. The United
States government sought to compel free public access to the
marina on the ground that it was automatically subject to the
federal navigational servitude, being "navigable water" of the
United States.1 21 In a majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist
(the author of Prune Yard), the Supreme Court rejected this
contention, and found that the attempt to procure free public
access, when the pond had become "navigable water" only be-
cause of the large investment of its owners, went so far be-
yond regulation as to constitute a taking.12 2
The Court stated that the prior approval given the dredg-
ing project by the Army Corps of Engineers could not estop
the United States, but
ness to sustain a regulation as a valid exercise of police power not requiring compen-
sation is whether the regulation's objective is one with a strong historic pattern of
social approval, rather than a novel policy goal lacking in acceptance in the commu-
nity. Mercer, Regulation (Police Power) v. Taking (Eminent Domain), 6 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 177, 193-94 (1975). This rationale would obviously be supportive of a finding that
preservation of forums for free speech is a valid police power objective.
119. 100 S. Ct. at 2042.
120. 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979).
121. Id. at 385-87.
122. Id. at 392.
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it can lead to the fruition of a number of expectancies em-
bodied in the concept of "property," - expectancies that, if
sufficiently important, the government must condemn and
pay for before it takes over the management of the land-
owner's property. In this case, we hold that the "right to ex-
clude," so universally held to be a fundamental element of
the property right, falls within this category of interests that
the Government cannot take without compensation. This is
not a case in which the Government is exercising its regula-
tory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial de-
valuation of petitioners' private property; rather, the imposi-
tion of the navigational servitude in this context will result
in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned
marina.123
While the facts in Kaiser Aetna were quite different from
those in PruneYard, both cases involved an attempt to man-
date free public access to private property, a "physical inva-
sion" of the property, and a "taking" of the right to exclude
others. The absolute language used in the Kaiser Aetna opin-
ion suggests that whenever these factors are present, a com-
pensable taking should be found. While the Kaiser Aetna
Court did take note of the large amount of money that had
been invested,'24 the basic unimportance of the value of what
is taken is suggested by its statement that "even if the Gov-
ernment physically invades only an easement in property [ar-
guably what is involved in PruneYard], it must nonetheless
pay just compensation.' ' 125 Yet in distinguishing the cases in
PruneYard, Justice Rehnquist simply noted that in Kaiser
Aetna, the attempt to grant public access "interfered with
Kaiser Aetna's 'reasonable investment backed expecta-
tions.' ,,126 In contrast, the owner of the PruneYard failed to
show that "the 'right to exclude others' [was] so essential to
the use or economic value of [his] property that the State-
authorized limitation of it amounted to a 'taking.' ,,127
This shifting from a "physical invasion" to a "diminution
123. Id. at 393 (footnotes and citations omitted; emphasis added).
124. Id. at 387. In dissent, Justice Blackmun objected to the majority opinion's
emphasis on the amount invested, noting that the legal result should be the same
whatever the amount. Id. at 395 n.2.
125. Id. at 393 (citation omitted).




of value" test typifies decisions in this area, but it does not
provide a wholly satisfying basis for distinguishing the cases.
The relatively slight expense and diminution in property
value involved is a partial justification for not compensating
the PruneYard's owner. However, another factor is also im-
portant. One of the major reasons a physical invasion presents
so clear a case for a "taking" is the psychological effect of
finding "an alien, uninvited presence in one's territory.. 128 In
other words, the "right to exclude" is regarded as such a basic
and important property right because of the strong expecta-
tion of privacy and control that accompanies ownership of
property. The PruneYard Court gave little emphasis to this
expectation. 12 9  Yet it is highly significant that the
PruneYard's owner voluntarily sacrificed much of his expecta-
tion of privacy when he opened his property to the public. His
diminished expectation of privacy goes far toward explaining
why it seems fair to require him to allow a "handful of addi-
tional orderly persons"130 to use his property. It also helps to
distinguish PruneYard and Kaiser Aetna. In the latter case,
the right of privacy had not only not been surrendered, but
that precise right had been purchased by those using the
marina.
It is true that the extent of diminution of value will usu-
ally parallel the degree to which privacy expectations are vio-
lated. However, there may well be instances where this rela-
tion breaks down. For example, in the case of a small, free-
standing store with its own parking lot, it might be found that
allowing free expression would not significantly diminish the
property's value or interfere with its use. Nevertheless, the
owner's greater expectation of control and privacy might lead
to a different result from that reached in the PruneYard case.
Supporting the result reached in PruneYard is a sugges-
tion in other recent cases that the strict equation of physical
invasion and taking is breaking down somewhat. One group of
such cases involves subdivision exactions, which occur when a
128. Michelman, supra note 101, at 1228.
129. The California court gave the expectation of privacy (or lack thereof) consid-
erably more emphasis than the United States Supreme Court did. See Robins v.
PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854, 860 (1979), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
130. Id. at 911, 592 P.2d at 347-48, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
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statute or ordinance requires developers to dedicate a certain
amount of land to the public for recreational and park pur-
poses as a condition of approval of a subdivision plat. While
some cases require that the dedication be tied specifically to
the need for additional park space created by the subdivision
in question, others recognize a more general public interest in
preserving open space in the face of population density
problems created in part by the construction of
subdivisions. 181
The general rationale of these cases is that the developer
receives a benefit from the state in the form of the opportu-
nity to subdivide his land. In return it is reasonable that he
should provide the additional open space that is needed in
part because of his activities. While shopping center owners
are perhaps not so directly benefited by the state, their crea-
tion and control of new "business districts" in the form of
shopping centers is made possible by the state's zoning laws.
The owners' monopolization of locations where residents in a
given area shop is certainly profitable to them. It also has the
effect of displacing such traditional first amendment forums
as downtown business districts. Like the subdivision devel-
oper, therefore, the shopping center owner does benefit, if in-.
directly, from the state, and has to some extent created the
need he is being asked to fill. Since the owner in Prune Yard is
not being required to dedicate part of his property to the pub-
lic completely, but merely to allow limited use of it for free
speech purposes, this seems to be a reasonable price for him
to pay.
Although the PruneYard Court's finding of "no taking" is
not wholly consistent with prior law, it is a fair result in the
circumstances. Two principal factors appear to be responsible
for the finding: the slight impairment of the property's value
and use and the insignificant privacy interests of the property
owner. It is to be anticipated that when these factors are pres-
ent in future cases, the same result will follow. However, as
suggested by the cautious tone of Justice White's concurring
opinion, 132 in a case where the expectation of privacy or inter-
131. See cases collected in Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 847 (1972).
132. 100 S. Ct. at 2048.
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ference with use is greater, it is likely that compensation to
the property owner would be required.1 33
133. In separate concurring opinions, both Justice White and Justice Powell took
pains to point out that the Court's holding was confined to the case before it, and
might well be different under slightly different circumstances. Thus, after indicating
that he joined the parts of the majority opinion dealing with property rights "on the
understanding that our decision is limited to the type of shopping center involved in
this case," 100 S. Ct. at 2048, Justice Powell went on to state:
Significantly different questions would be presented if a State authorized
strangers to picket or leafleteer in privately owned, freestanding stores and
commercial premises. Nor does our decision today apply to all "shopping cen-
ters." This generic term may include retail establishments that vary widely in
size, location, and other relevant characteristics. Even large establishments
may be able to show that the number or type of persons wishing to speak on
their premises would create a substantial annoyance to customers that could
be eliminated only by elaborate, expensive, and possibly unenforceable time,
place, and manner restrictions.
Id.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall also took a different approach to the
property rights question than did the majority. The author of Food Employees Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), Justice Marshall began by stat-
ing his continuing conviction that Logan was rightly decided, and by applauding the
broad protection given free speech rights on shopping center property by the Califor-
nia court. He went on to interpret the PruneYard owner's claim that his property had
been "taken" without just compensation as "largely a restatement of the question of
whether and to what extent a State may abrogate or modify common-law rights." 100
S. Ct. at 2046. That is, by "taking" the shopping center owner's right to use the
common law of trespass to exclude unwanted speakers, did California violate the fed-
eral conptitutional prohibition against taking of property without just compensation?
In answering this question in the negative, Justice Marshall noted that even if a
common-law cause of action qualified as "property" for purposes of the taking clause,
the state's interest in fashioning its own rules of law and in modifying the existing
common law to fit the times would ordinarily be paramount to the individual's inter-
est in preserving this "property." Justice Marshall saw two limitations on this state-
ment. First, the state's action cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable. Second, the state
probably would run up against federal constitutional barriers should it attempt to
abolish whole categories of "core" common-law rights (e.g., all common-law rules re-
garding liability between employer and employee), unless a compelling showing of
necessity were made or a reasonable alternative provided. Id. at 2046-47.
Justice Marshall found that this "core" had not been approached in the
PruneYard case, for reasons very similar to those supporting the majority's conclu-
sion that no taking had occurred: the shopping center was already open to the public,
so no privacy interests were involved; time, place, and manner regulations could be
imposed; there was no showing of interference with normal business operations. Id. at
2047. The factors entering into Justice Marshall's conclusion suggest that despite his
approving attitude toward provision of free speech rights on private property, he too
might find a "taking" had occurred should such rights be granted in circumstances
where the owner's privacy was invaded or his business interfered with.
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II. THE SHOPPING CENTER OWNER'S FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS
The final issue considered by the Prune Yard Court was
whether California's granting access to shopping center prop-
erty for free speech purposes violated the shopping center
owner's first amendment rights. This argument does not seem
to have been made in the earlier line of "shopping center
cases." The Court in PruneYard appeared to have little diffi-
culty rejecting it. There was no general discussion of the is-
sues involved, only a careful distinction of three prior cases
apparently relied on by the shopping center owner. However,
Justice Powell's concurring opinion adopted a more caution-
ary tone, criticizing the Court's approach as misleadingly
broad.
The first two cases distinguished in the Prune Yard opin-
ion relate to compelled speech, the right to remain silent, and
government speech. Wooley v. Maynard34 involved a Jeho-
vah's Witness who objected on religious and moral grounds to
displaying the New Hampshire state motto, "Live Free or
Die," on his automobile license plates, as required by state
law. After covering up the motto, Mr. Maynard was repeat-
edly prosecuted and convicted under another state statute
that made it a misdemeanor to cover the "letters" on a license
plate."3 5 The issue was whether New Hampshire could impose
such sanctions without violating the first amendment.
The district court held that Maynard's covering of the
motto was "symbolic speech"" 6 protected by the first amend-
ment, and New Hampshire's attempted restriction of such
134. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
135. Id. at 707-08.
136. Id. at 713. "Symbolic speech," or voluntary self-expression through conduct,
has been recognized by the Court when (1) such conduct is intended to convey a
particularized message and (2) there is a strong likelihood the message will be under-
stood. While "speech plus" does not enjoy first amendment protection to the level
pure speech does, it is protected expression and, as in the Wooley case, may be found
to outweigh countervailing state interests. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (flag
desecration). See generally Note, Symbolic Speech, 9 IND. L. REv. 1009 (1976); Com-
ment, Unconstitutional Government Speech, 15 SAN DMGo L. REV. 815 (1978); Com-




speech was unconstitutional.137 The United States Supreme
Court refused to pass on the symbolic speech issue because it
found "more appropriate First Amendment grounds"1 8 on
which to affirm, namely, compelled expression. Relying on
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette39 and
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo 40 (the other two
cases distinguished in the PruneYard opinion), the Court
stated that the " 'individual freedom of mind' ,141 protected
by the first amendment encompassed a right not to speak as
well as a right to speak. This principle was violated when the
state required an individual "to participate in the dissemina-
tion of an ideological message by displaying it on his private
property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be
observed and read by the public. '1 42
The Wooley majority found that the factual differences be-
tween Wooley and the earlier Barnette case relied on as prec-
edent were not controlling.1 43 Barnette also involved a Jeho-
vah's Witness, who challenged the constitutionality of a public
school flag salute requirement.'" Noting that the flag salute
was a symbolic utterance that required "affirmation of a belief
and an attitude of mind,"'45 the Court held that a state could
not constitutionally impose on the individual "a ceremony so
touching matters of opinion and political attitude."' 46 The
fact that the message was an ideological one chosen by the
state played an important part in the Court's reasoning.' 47
While the state may foster national unity by other methods, it
may not do so by compulsion.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constella-
137. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381 (1976).
138. 430 U.S. at 713.
139. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
140. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See discussion of Tornillo in text accompanying notes
163-76 infra.
141. 430 U.S. at 714, quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 637 (1943).
142. 430 U.S. at 713.
143. Id. at 715.
144. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 625-30 (1943).
145. Id. at 633.
146. Id. at 636. In so holding, the Court overruled a case decided only three years
earlier, Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
147. 319 U.S. at 631, 633, 636, 640-42.
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tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which per-
mit an exception, they do not now occur to Us. 1 4R
While admitting that Wooley did not involve the kind of
active affirmation of a state-prescribed message at issue in
Barnette, the majority in Wooley held this distinction to be
merely "one of degree. ' 149 Like the schoolchildren in Bar-
nette, Maynard was forced, as part of his daily life, "to be an
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological
point of view he finds unacceptable"1 50 - and this the Consti-
tution does not allow.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist objected to this analysis,
stating his view that first amendment principles are not impli-
cated unless the state "place[s] the citizen in the position of
either apparently or actually 'asserting as true' the mes-
sage." 5 This requirement was not met in Wooley. Few people
were likely to think Maynard was personally asserting the
state motto, and he was free to proclaim his opposition
thereto as long as he did not cover up the motto.252
Although the Wooley majority might well have agreed with
the result reached in PruneYard, the PruneYard opinion
seemed to draw more on Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Wooley than on the majority's view. Writing now for the
PruneYard majority, Justice Rehnquist distinguished Wooley
from PruneYard on three bases: (1) the shopping center is
not a private car or home but a business open to the public,
and thus the views expressed by speakers who use it as a fo-
rum will not be likely to be identified with those of the owner;
(2) no state-prescribed message is involved, so there is no dan-
ger of governmental discrimination for or against a particular
message; and (3) the shopping center owner can easily disa-
vow connection with the speakers' views.153 Barnette was dis-
tinguished on similar grounds. Unlike the children in Bar-
148. Id. at 642.
149. 430 U.S. at 715.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 721.
152. Id. at 721-22.
153. 100 S. Ct. at 2044.
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nette, the shopping center owner is not being "compelled to
affirm [his] belief in any governmentally prescribed position
or view"'154 and may dissociate himself from the speakers'
messages.
A number of questions can be raised about the PruneYard
majority's approach. First, the majority in Wooley found it to
be only a matter of degree, and not a controlling distinction,
that in Barnette the state compelled active affirmation of be-
lief while Wooley involved passive conduct. This rationale
could be used to argue that the distinction between Wooley
and PruneYard is also merely a matter of degree and should
not be controlling. In this respect, however, Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent in Wooley seems better reasoned than the ma-
jority, in that an actual or apparent affirmation of belief
would seem to be an important, if not a necessary, element of
a sustainable claim of unconstitutionally compelled expres-
sion.155 Thus, the first amendment interests involved seem
slight when (1) there is no compulsion actually to affirm a be-
lief one does not hold, and (2) the circumstances make it un-
likely anyone will think such a belief is being affirmed.
A related question is the importance of governmental pre-
scription of the message. Both Wooley and Barnette empha-
sized the fact that the state was compelling affirmation of its
ideological message. 5 8 However, it is difficult to tell whether
this fact was controlling, and if so to what degree. In Wooley,
at least, the governmentally prescribed nature of the message
seemed to be partly what led the Court to find that even its
passive display could not be constitutionally compelled.1 57 In
154. Id.
155. The Wooley majority did not explicitly reject this view. The language about
"matter of degree" may have been intended to signify that while Wooley involved
passive, not active conduct, it still amounted to a compelled apparent affirmation of
belief. Another factor significant to the majority's view was undoubtedly that the case
involved display of a governmentally prescribed ideological message. See text accom-
panying notes 156-62 infra.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in PruneYard, suggests several cases in
which he thinks a claim of compelled expression could be sustained even though no
actual or apparent affirmation of belief occurs. These examples are not wholly con-
vincing, however. See text accompanying notes 182-83 infra.
156. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631, 633, 636, 640-
42 (1943); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713, 715, 717 (1977).
157. For instance, shortly after concluding that the difference between Wooley
and Barnette was merely a matter of degree, the Wooley majority stated:
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fact, Wooley has been interpreted to be based ultimately not
on a theory of compelled expression, but on an implicit find-
ing that governmental "speech" regarding political or ideologi-
cal matters is unconstitutional in itself."' 8
This interpretation of the role of "government speech" in
Wooley seems to go too far. The majority in PruneYard did
rely on the lack of any state-prescribed message to distinguish
the case from Wooley.1 59 However, it seems likely that this
was a contributing rather than a controlling factor. For one
thing, Justice Rehnquist selected as the "[m]ost important"160
distinction between Wooley and PruneYard the fact that in
the latter case the speakers' views were not likely to be associ-
ated with those of the shopping center owner. For another, in
both Wooley and Barnette the Court indicated that while the
state may not compel anyone to "foster" its ideological mes-
sage, it may use other methods to get the message across."'
Finally, it is not difficult to imagine cases where, even without
New Hampshire's statute in effect requires that appellees use their private
property as a "mobile billboard" for the State's ideological message - or suffer
a penalty, as Maynard already has.... The First Amendment protects the
right of individuals... to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire com-
mands, an idea they find morally objectionable.
430 U.S. at 715.
158. See Comment, Unconstitutional Government Speech, 15 SAN DEGo L. REv.
815 (1978).
Professor Yudof has noted that the role of government speech within the frame-
work of the first amendment has received minimal discussion by legal scholars, de-
spite its importance. In an article designed to begin to remedy this deficiency, he
looks at some of the indirect restraints placed on government speech by affirmation of
individuals' first amendment rights and investigates several theories under which
more direct restraints might be imposed. Professor Yudof treats Barnette and
Wooley as representing restraints on the manner in which the government may speak
rather than as outright prohibitions of government speech itself. Thus, it is compelled
expression, not government speech per se, that creates the constitutional violation.
See Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward A Theory of Governmental Expres-
sion and the First Amendment, 57 Tax. L. REV. 863 (1979).
159. 100 S. Ct. at 2044.
160. Id.
161. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631, 640 (1943).
In Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977), the Court stated:
The State is seeking to communicate to others an official view as to proper
"appreciation of history, state pride, [and] individualism." Of course, the State
may legitimately pursue such interests in any number of ways. However, where
the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to
some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to
avoid becoming the courier for such a message.
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a governmentally prescribed message, a violation of the con-
stitutionally protected right not to speak should surely be
found. For instance, a governmental attempt to force an indi-
vidual to allow third parties to display ideological messages on
signs in front of the individual's home could hardly be consid-
ered permissible under the first amendment, even though no
message was prescribed by the government. 162
It can be seen that the role of (1) government speech and
(2) the existence of an actual or apparent affirmation of belief
as factors in a determination that speech has been unconstitu-
tionally compelled is not entirely clear. It can at least be said
that both are important considerations and that each tends to
reinforce the other. That is, if the message is ideological and
prescribed by the state, the level of active affirmation neces-
sary to result in a constitutional violation drops. Similarly, if
it is very clear that an affirmation of political or philosophical
belief has been governmentally compelled, it may not matter
that the state has not dictated the message.
Something akin to compelled speech was at issue in the
third case distinguished in the PruneYard opinion, Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.6 3  In some respects
Tornillo is closer to PruneYard than Wooley is, since it dealt
with a governmental attempt to compel access by third par-
ties to a privately controlled forum. However, Tornillo also
involved the constitutional guarantee of a free press, and the
PruneYard majority found this difference and its implications
controlling.
In Tornillo the Supreme Court struck down a Florida stat-
ute requiring newspapers to grant political candidates equal
162. Cases involving compelled expression in which the government has not pre-
scribed the message seem to be rare. The cases dealing with right of access to the
media could perhaps be put in this category, though the considerations involved are
somewhat different from those involved in the Wooley situation. See text accompany-
ing notes 163-76 infra.
One additional voice in support of the position that government speech is not
essential to a finding of compelled speech is Justice Powell, who stated in his concur-
ring opinion in PruneYard: "[E]ven when no particular message is mandated by the
State, First Amendment interests are affected by state action that forces a property
owner to admit third-party speakers. In many situations, a right of access is no less
intrusive than speech compelled by the State itself." 100 S. Ct. at 2049. He goes on to
cite several cases involving access to the media.
163. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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space in which to reply to criticisms of them printed by a
newspaper."" The statute's proponents argued that a "right of
access"' 1 5 was needed because of the increasing monopoliza-
tion of newspapers by a limited number of private parties, re-
sulting in exclusion of many who wished to speak from the
"marketplace of ideas." '
Without evaluating this assessment of the current situa-
tion, the Court in Tornillo held that the asserted right of ac-
cess infringed on the first amendment guarantee of freedom of
the press. In an argument reminiscent of the "right not to
speak" language in Wooley, the Court pointed out that the
Florida right-to-reply statute "operates as a command in the
same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to
publish specified matter"' 7' (i.e., the right to print includes
the right not to print). The Court's basic objection was to the
statute's "intrusion into the function of editors"'6 8 and at-
tempt to override editorial judgment. Also noted was the pen-
alty imposed based on the paper's content, in the form of ad-
ded publication costs and loss of space that could be used to
print other matter. The overall effect of the statute, the Court
feared, would be to dampen public debate. 169
The majority opinion in PruneYard distinguished Tornillo
on the basis that it involved concerns related to freedom of
the press not at issue in PruneYard. The shopping center
owner could not claim the editor's right not to be told what to
print. There was no intrusion on editorial judgment, and no
danger existed that editors might be deterred from publishing
controversial political statements. °
The special protections to be accorded editorial judgment
and freedom of the press in general seem to be an adequate
basis for distinguishing PruneYard and Tornillo. When a
broader view is taken, however, a possible inconsistency can
be found in the way the Court has dealt with arguments sup-
porting a right of access to the media, to company town prop-
164. Id. at 243-46, 257-58.
165. Id. at 247.
166. Id. at 248.
167. Id. at 256.
168. Id. at 258.
169. Id. at 256-58.
170. 100 S. Ct. at 2044.
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erty (as in Marsh v. Alabama),"7 and to shopping center
property. In contrast to Tornillo, a right of access to the
broadcast media was upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC. 72 Because broadcast frequencies represent a "scarce re-
source,"1 73 the broadcaster's first amendment rights must be
limited by the citizen's right to receive a broad range of views
and information. 4 The right of access advocates in Tornillo
lost when they tried to use a similar argument based on the
increasing "scarcity" of access to newspapers due to growing
monopolization.
The shopping center and company town situation can be
seen as analogous to the monopolization of the media. The
shopping center monopolizes a different, but traditional, first
amendment forum, the streets of the public business dis-
trict.1 5 Concern about this monopolization seemed to be at
least partly responsible for the Marsh decision, which stressed
the public's right to receive information in a way very remi-
niscent of the Red Lion opinion.1 78 Despite the similar policy
considerations involved with respect to broadcasting, the print
media, and shopping centers, however, the Supreme Court has
been willing to support a significant right of access only in the
case of broadcasting, where the scarcity of the resource is ap-
parent from its physical limitations.
The PruneYard decision is, of course, irrelevant to the
above concerns in a way, since it deals with defenses to a right
of access that has already been granted by a state court. For
171. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
172. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The case sustained, against statutory and first amend-
ment challenges, the FCC's fairness doctrine, which requires broadcasters to present
discussion of public issues and to give all sides of such issues fair coverage. Two regu-
lations codifying the doctrine were also sustained: they mandated a right to reply for
(1) individuals personally attacked in broadcasts and (2) political opponents of candi-
dates endorsed or opposed on a broadcast.
This apparently broad right of access to the broadcast media was limited in Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), which
held that the first amendment did not require broadcasters to accept paid editorial
advertisements. See generally Chatzky & Robinson, A Constitutional Right of Access
to Newspapers: Is There Life After Tornillo?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 453 (1976).
173. 395 U.S. at 376.
174. Id. at 389-90.
175. See discussion of Justice Marshall's ideas on this topic in text accompanying
note 85 supra.
176. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946). Cf. note 26 supra.
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this reason the decision says little about whether such a right
of access should be granted in the first place, the bases on
which it could be granted, or the rules under which the forum
is to operate once it is opened.
This observation indicates one significant area of questions
left unanswered by the Prune Yard case. The PruneYard's
owner may impose reasonable time, place, and manner regula-
tions - but may he also exclude speakers whose messages he
finds offensive? The state may not regulate speech in a public
forum on the basis of its content.17 7 The application of this
rule to shopping center owners, however, would require a find-
ing that the action of the owner was state action. A related
issue concerns control of the forum: should the shopping
center owner alone control the forum, or does the state have a
right or an obligation to oversee its use? If too many speakers
want to use the available space, by whom and on what basis is
the needed allocation to be made? These are the types of
questions related to the use of privately owned forums that
will have to be answered in the future.17
The concurring opinions in PruneYard suggest other mat-
ters that remain unresolved. Specifically, with respect to the
shopping center owner's first amendment defense, Justice
177. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976).
178. There is a substantial body of law dealing with the so-called public forum
concept. Focusing on first amendment rights on publicly owned property, these cases
have wrestled with such questions as whether there is a right of minimum access to
traditional public forums like streets and parks for first amendment purposes, such
that access may never be denied completely, or only a right of equal access, such that
once a forum is opened discrimination between speakers on the basis of content be-
comes impermissible. Similar questions arise with respect to nontraditional forums
like the posters displayed on city buses. See generally Kalven, The Concept of the
Public Forum, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public
Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233; Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal
Access, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 117 (1975).
In comparison to the public forum cases, cases dealing with privately owned fo-
rums have been scarce, apparently being limited largely to the shopping center cases
and the media access cases. The rules that have been developed with respect to the
public forum are not that clear, and it is doubtful that they can or should be applied
in any wholesale fashion to privately owned forums, given the substantial differences
between the two (e.g., the historical basis of rights thought to adhere in such tradi-
tional public forums as streets and parks; the possible lack of state action in the
private forum situation; the rights of the private owner versus the rights of the gov-
ernmental owner). The courts may face a considerable task as they try to develop
rules for the use of privately owned forums.
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Powell, joined by Justice White, objected to the breadth of
the majority opinion and suggested situations in which he
thought the shopping center owner's first amendment rights
should prevail. Relying on Wooley, Barnette, and Tornillo, he
noted that the right not to speak may be violated (1) when
listeners are likely to think the views expressed are those of
the owner or (2) when the owner feels compelled to respond to
the speakers because their views are offensive to him.
The first situation accords with the emphasis in the major-
ity opinion. Justice Powell gave some examples suggestive of
possible results in future cases. For instance, the property
owner's first amendment rights might be violated if access to
the bulletin board of a freestanding store, hotel, office, or
small shopping center were to be mandated.180 Justice Powell
objected to the majority's suggestion that this kind of problem
is somehow remedied if the owner is free to dissociate himself
from the views expressed. He saw the owner as having a right
not to speak at all that seems considerably broader than the
right delineated in the majority opinion.""
This broad interpretation is apparent in the second situa-
tion cited by Justice Powell. He discussed two kinds of cases.
In the first kind of case, the property owner is faced with
speakers whose views are so morally repugnant to him that he
feels compelled to respond. In the second kind of case, he is
faced with the probability of having to "host" some causes he
opposes. If he feels compelled to identify these, his" 'freedom
to maintain his own beliefs without public disclosure' ",182 will
be violated. In these latter cases the shopping center owner's
right to control his own speech "may be burdened impermissi-
bly even when listeners will not assume that the messages ex-
pressed on private property are those of the owner."183
Justice Powell's concurrence suggests that the shopping
center owner's first amendment claim may not be dismissed as
easily in slightly different situations. In fact, if the Court fol-
lowed Justice Powell's reasoning with respect to the second
set of examples he cites, the grant of a right of access could
179. 100 S. Ct. at 2049-51.






turn out to be largely illusory. While the shopping center own-
er may not be able to produce a specific speaker whose views
he finds morally offensive, he should not find it difficult, in
almost every case, to allege that some of those who might use
the property have views he opposes. Given the high degree of
compulsion generally existing in the cases that are authority
for the right not to speak, this seems to be stretching that
right to its outer limits, if not beyond.
III. CONCLUSION
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins184 clears the way
for state-created solutions to the problem of dwindling first
amendment forums caused by the growing displacement of
public business districts by private shopping centers. In hold-
ing that the shopping center owner's federal constitutional
property and free speech rights do not bar provision of access
to shopping center property on the basis of a state constitu-
tional provision, the Supreme Court in PruneYard has made
it clear that states should not feel themselves confined by the
restrictive, state-action-based holdings of such cases as Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner.185 The favorable attitude towards states'
rights manifested by the PruneYard decision suggests that
those seeking to protect and expand basic civil rights will have
the best chance of success if they rely primarily, or even ex-
clusively, on state statutory or constitutional provisions.1 86
184. 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
185. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
186. As Justice Brennan has pointed out, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over
state cases is limited to the correction of errors related to federal law. Thus, a deci-
sion based entirely on state law cannot even be reviewed by the Supreme Court un-
less it somehow implicates a federal question. Even a decision that does involve fed-
eral issues cannot be reviewed by the Court if there is an independent and adequate
state ground to support the judgment (because of the policy against the Court's giv-
ing advisory opinions). See Brennan, supra note 83, at 501.
The PruneYard decision has implications for exercise of free speech rights other
than on shopping center property. Questions very similar to those involved in the
shopping center cases have arisen in cases dealing with access for free speech pur-
poses to migrant labor camps, which are usually owned and controlled by private
parties. Presumably a right of access could be found in such cases, as in PruneYard,
based on a state statute or constitutional provision. See generally Comment, Access
to Migrant Labor Camps: Marsh v. Alabama Revisited, 55 Cm.-KENr L. REv. 285
(1979). Cases involving labor disputes are another class of cases where a PruneYard-
type approach might be useful.
It should be noted that while the PruneYard case involved a state law, the deci-
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This state-by-state, piecemeal approach to the protection
of basic rights seems far from ideal, but it may be necessary in
a period when the United States Supreme Court is, in some
areas at least, restricting rather than expanding federal con-
stitutional safeguards.18 7 As Justice Brennan has pointed out,
American jurisprudence provides two levels of protection -
state and federal - for fundamental civil liberties. The cur-
rent Court, however, has seen fit to leave protection of certain
individual rights up to the states, in the name of federalism.1 88
While disagreeing with this approach, Justice Brennan notes
that it "constitutes a clear call to state courts to step into the
breach." '189 The PruneYard case is important as an indication
that the Supreme Court will be receptive if states respond to
this call.
The limits likely to be placed on the protection of free
speech rights facilitated by the PruneYard decision are not
completely clear. One strong indication of these limits may be
found in the numerous concurring opinions in the case. 190 The
generally cautionary tone of these opinions suggests that
slight variations in the facts might lead to a different result.191
Indeed, throughout the decision are indications that the
PruneYard's owner might have won if he had simply been
able to prove a few additional facts, for instance, that he
found the petitioners' position "morally repugnant"1 92 or that
his business was suffering substantially.
Another limitation is that, as Justice White pointed out in
his concurring opinion, states are not required by the federal
constitution to grant speakers access to private property. It is
wholly up to them whether or not to do so.19 The effect of the
PruneYard holding will thus depend partly on decisions made
sion makes it clear (if it was not so already) that cases like Lloyd and Hudgens do not
preclude access to private property based on a federal statute either.
187. See Brennan, supra note 83; Yarbrough, supra note 82.
188. See Brennan, supra note 83, at 502-04.
189. Id. at 503.
190. Justice Blackmun filed a statement concurring in part; Justice Marshall filed
a concurring opinion; Justice White filed an opinion concurring in part and in the
judgment, and also joined in a separate opinion filed by Justice Powell concurring in
part and in the judgment.
191. See especially opinions by Justices White and Powell.
192. 100 S. Ct. at 2050.
193. Id. at 2048.
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by the individual states as to the kind of protection they wish
to provide.
California law has a number of unusual characteristics in
the area of free speech rights. First, the state constitutional
provision involved in the PruneYard case is worded more
broadly and affirmatively than the corresponding provision in
the United States Constitution. 194 It has been interpreted to
protect free speech against private as well as governmental in-
terference1 5 and to impose an obligation on government ac-
tively to promote opportunities for effective speech.1 98 Second,
prior to the PruneYard decision, the California courts had a
history of providing unusually broad protection for free ex-
pression. Access to shopping center property for free speech
purposes had been permitted in both labor-related 9 7 and non-
labor-related1 8 situations, as had access to a privately owned
railroad station 19 and a sidewalk in front of a large supermar-
ket.200 Finally, the right to petition the government is given
special significance under California law.201
194. The California provision states: "Every person may freely speak, write and
publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this
right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I,
§2.
The first amendment to the United States Constitution simply states: "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. L
195. See, e.g., In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 849, 434 P.2d 353, 354, 64 Cal. Rptr.
97, 98 (1967). See generally Federalism, supra note 21, at 809-11.
196. See, e.g., Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 411 P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537,
cert. denied 385 U.S. 844 (1966). See generally Federalism, supra note 21, at 809-11.
197. See Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers'
Union, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964). See generally Federal-
ism, supra note 21, at 811-15.
198. Diamond v. Bland (Diamond I), 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal Rptr. 501
(1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971). This case involved facts very similar to the
PruneYard case. As noted earlier, it was overruled in Diamond v. Bland (Diamond
H), 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974),
a result the California court thought was compelled by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972). See notes 12 and 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
199. See In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
200. See In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969).
201. As stated by the California court in Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center,
23 Cal. 3d 899, 907-08, 592 P.2d 341, 345, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 858 (1979), af'd, 100 S.
Ct. 2035 (1980) (footnote omitted): "The California Constitution declares that 'people
have the right to ... petition government for redress of grievances ... .,' (Art. I, § 3.)
That right in California is, moreover, vital to a basic process in the state's constitu-
tional scheme - direct initiation of change by the citizenry through initiative, refer-
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Many states will not have such an impressive history of
granting free speech rights broader than those provided by
the Federal Constitution. However, such a history is obviously
not necessary to the passage of a state statute protecting free
speech on private property, a course which might have sub-
stantial advantages over a judicially created right of access in
any case.20 2 Furthermore, even if a state's constitutional provi-
sion regarding free speech is worded identically to that in the
Federal Constitution, the state is still free to interpret it as
providing broader protection.20
A number of paths are open to the states to create a right
of access to privately owned property for free speech pur-
poses. The PruneYard case indicates that these paths are
largely free of federal constitutional obstacles, at least under
similar facts. The ultimate effect of the PruneYard decision
will depend on the extent to which individual states choose to
take advantage of this opportunity, and on how far their ef-
forts are allowed to proceed before the Supreme Court im-
poses further limitations.
CORDELIA S. MUNROE
PROPERTY-Caveat Emptor-Duty to Disclose Lim-
ited to Commercial Vendors. Ollerman v. O'Rourke
Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980) and Kanack
v. Kremski, 96 Wis. 2d 426, 291 N.W.2d 864 (1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
Note, that by the civil law every man is bound to warrant
endum, and recall. (Cal. Const., art. 11, §§ 8, 9, and 13.)"
Because of this special importance of the right to petition, it has been carefully
guarded by the California courts. See generally Federalism, supra note 21, at 838-40.
202. Provision of a right of access via a legislative enactment would allow review
of data concerning, for instance, the prevalence of shopping centers in the state in
question. Such review, coupled with legislative hearings, would permit a better esti-
mate to be made of the need for special protection of free speech rights than is possi-
ble if the right of access is judicially created. Also, a statutory measure could deal
with such questions as control of the forum, the owner's rights, and so on, with a
detail not possible in judicial decisions.
203. See note 88 supra.
19811
